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Kant on Materialism
Abstract: In this paper I argue that Kant’s complex argument against 
materialism involves not only his generic commitment to the existence of 
non-spatio-temporal and thus non-material things in themselves (which 
follows directly from Transcendental Idealism), but also considerations 
pertaining to reason and the subject of our thoughts. Specifically, I argue 
that because Kant conceives of reason in such a way that it demands a 
commitment to the existence of the unconditioned so that we can account 
for whatever conditioned objects we encounter in experience, our thoughts, 
which are also conditioned, require something unconditioned that, because it
is unconditioned, cannot be material. In this way, Kant’s attitude towards 
materialism is based not only on abstract features of his metaphysics and 
epistemology, but also on specific features that were under serious 
discussion in the early modern period.
Keywords: Kant, materialism, unconditioned, I, psychology
Kant’s views on materialism in the Critique of Pure Reason have long been a 
source of puzzlement. On the one hand, refuting materialism seems to be 
one of the goals that motivates his overall project. To preserve the possibility
of moral obligation, moral action, and moral responsibility, freedom must be 
defended against all objections, and one of the most dangerous threats to 
freedom was thought to be materialism, given that a materialist conception 
of human beings seemed to leave no room for the possibility of freedom 
insofar as the behavior of matter is fully determined by mechanistic laws. In 
line with this thought, Kant claims in the second edition Preface to the first 
Critique that he intends to ‘sever the very root of materialism’ (Bxxxiv).1 On 
the other hand, it is striking that in a work that extends over eight hundred 
pages, very little space is explicitly devoted to the topic, and when it is 
discussed, it is mentioned primarily as an almost accidental corollary to the 
Second Paralogism’s treatment of the soul’s simplicity (B420).2 Given the 
threat that materialism seemed to represent to freedom at the time and 
given Kant’s recognition of the severity of the threat, it is surprising that he 
did not devote more explicit discussion to the topic.
Now Karl Ameriks has helped to remove some of the mystery here by 
showing that Kant takes materialism, as a general thesis, to be ruled out by 
Transcendental Idealism. Transcendental Idealism is famously based on a 
distinction between appearances and things in themselves, where 
appearances are spatio-temporal objects that depend on our subjective 
forms of intuition, and things in themselves are non-spatio-temporal objects 
that exist independently of our subjective forms of intuition.3 Ameriks brings 
Transcendental Idealism to bear on materialism by way of the following 
argument: If matter is defined as the movable in space, then it is essentially 
spatial but if, as Transcendental Idealism maintains, things in themselves are
not spatial, then things in themselves cannot be matter.4 Given Kant’s 
commitment to the existence of things in themselves, there must be things 
that are not matter. Now this is surely a good refutation of materialism, as 
far as it goes, and it is also plausible to hold that this is at least part of Kant’s
justification for claiming that he is in a position to refute materialism.5
At the same time, even if Ameriks’ account is correct, it may not be the
whole story. For if it turned out that things in themselves were indeed 
immaterial and that all appearances consisted entirely of matter, the 
materialist might well concede to having lost a minor battle (regarding things
in themselves), but declare a resounding victory in the larger war.6 For the 
materialist could, in a first step, distinguish between different kinds of 
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materialism, with universal materialism being the doctrine that everything 
consists only of matter, cosmological materialism that everything in the 
world consists only of matter, and psychological materialism that human 
beings consist only of matter.7 And the materialist could then, in a second 
step, note that even if one were to concede that Kant had refuted the first 
two kinds of materialism, that would still not immediately entail the falsity of 
the last kind, for even if some things in the world are not material, human 
beings might still be material through and through.8 That is, even if one were
to accept Transcendental Idealism and that every (spatio-temporal) 
appearance must be grounded in a (non-spatio-temporal and thus non-
material) thing in itself, the psychological materialist could still maintain that 
a human being is exclusively material, even while granting that human 
beings are grounded in something that is not material. What’s more, it is 
clear that psychological materialism is especially relevant in this context 
since what most interested both early modern materialists and their 
opponents, including Kant, was the feasibility of providing explanations of 
human beings that appeal only to matter and the mechanistic laws of motion
that govern it.9 Being told that unknowable things in themselves, which 
(somehow) ground the spatio-temporal world of appearances, are not 
material, might be viewed as an instance of ‘spooky metaphysics’ that 
materialists would hardly embrace with open arms, but one could imagine 
that they might simply dismiss that point as basically irrelevant to their 
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primary concern with explaining what human beings are and how they 
function in the material world.
To find an interpretation of Kant’s refutation of materialism that 
advances an argument that can supplement the one Ameriks has already 
presented, we must focus on those features of his position that are specific 
to human thought and on how those features can be exploited against the 
psychological materialist. It turns out that Kant’s most promising argument 
against the psychological materialist draws on features that emerge from his
distinctive analysis of reason as a spontaneous faculty that searches for 
conditions. More specifically, we must understand (1) Kant’s account of real 
(as opposed to logical) conditions, (2) how, in the first three Paralogisms, 
representations require different kinds of real conditions, and (3) how reason
can makes use of real conditions in inferring from the existence of 
conditioned objects to the existence of something unconditioned.10 With a 
clearer understanding of these three points and the larger picture that they 
paint, we can turn to Kant’s analysis of the Paralogisms and, on that basis, 
reconstruct his argument against psychological materialism. The basic idea 
will be that the I cannot, according to Kant, be material because what is 
unconditioned cannot be material and the I, whatever its ontological status it
might be, is the unconditioned condition of my thoughts. By pursuing this 
line of thought, we can see how it is that Kant hopes to refute the 
psychological materialist and thereby remove one significant threat to 
freedom.
4
I. Reason, Real Conditions, and the Unconditioned
It is a distinctive feature of Kant’s account of reason that it is defined 
as a spontaneous faculty that seeks not only the conditions for what is 
conditioned, but also the totality of conditions and hence the unconditioned. 
This point can be expressed in more contemporary terms, and perhaps less 
obscurely, by noting that reason is interested not only in explanations 
(conditions) of whatever stands in need of explanation (what is conditioned), 
but also in total and complete explanations, that is, in explanations that 
cover everything that stands in need of explanation (i.e., that explain 
everything conditioned) and in terms that do not themselves admit of further
explanation (i.e., in what is “unconditioned”).  For only then will reason have 
found a satisfactory ‘resting place’ (A584/B612). We will return to the 
unconditioned shortly, but we must first understand his conception of a 
condition more fully, especially since the unconditioned has to be explained 
in terms of it.
Though Kant is fully committed to the unity of reason–reason is one 
and the same faculty in all contexts in which it is employed–he distinguishes 
between the logical and real uses of reason (A303/B359, A305/B362). 
Reason in its logical use gives rise to syllogisms, which express, Kant 
maintains, logical conditioning relations between cognitions (namely 
between the major and minor premises and the conclusion). Specifically, the 
major premise expresses a condition, and the minor premise is subsumed 
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under the condition expressed in the major in such a way that the conclusion
then logically follows. Given this conception of a syllogism, it makes sense to
say that the premises are conditions for the conclusion, which is conditioned.
What’s more, Kant thinks that the different kinds of syllogisms–categorical, 
hypothetical (e.g., modus ponens and tollens), and disjunctive (A304/B361)–
are determined by the different kinds of conditioning relations in the major 
premise (in the form of categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments).
Thus, by way of the notion of a logical conditioning relation, which holds 
between cognitions, Kant is able to bring his characterization of reason 
together with his theory of syllogisms.
But Kant also identifies a real use of reason, which pertains not to 
logical conditioning relations between cognitions in syllogisms, but rather to 
real conditioning relations between objects (taking ‘object’ here in a very 
broad sense so as to include both physical and mental entities). That is, just 
as a conclusion depends logically on the major and minor premises in a 
syllogism, so too an object (or its state) can depend on other objects in the 
world. The basic idea here is that the notion of a real condition gives 
expression to what we might call metaphysical dependence. And just as Kant
is committed to different kinds of logical conditions in different kinds of 
syllogisms, so too he is committed to different kinds of real conditions 
between different kinds of objects. For example, Kant clearly holds that (1) 
one moment in time is a condition of the moment that follows it, (2) parts are
conditions of the whole they compose, and (3) a cause is a condition of its 
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effect. Given these and other examples, Kant seems to be operating with a 
generic notion of real conditioning that involves an asymmetrical, transitive, 
and intelligible relation of metaphysical dependence, and these three 
examples are all different specific instances of that generic notion.11
In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant makes various remarks that 
clarify the different kinds of real conditions that he acknowledges. The three 
examples just listed are discussed, for instance, in the (first three) 
Antinomies, which are interested in the ‘unity of objective conditions in 
appearance’ (A406/B432), that is, in the different kinds of real conditions of 
objects that appear in the (spatio-temporal) world. The Ideal of Pure Reason, 
by contrast, is interested in the ‘unity of objective conditions of the 
possibility of objects in general’ (A406/B433), that is, in the real condition of 
all possibility, while the Paralogisms concern ‘the subjective conditions of all 
representations in general (of the subject or the soul)’ (A406/B433), that is, 
in the real conditions of all of our representations.
Now one can see, in a general way, how the Paralogisms focus on the 
real conditions of our representations, since representations are obviously 
conditioned in various respects. For representations clearly depend in 
different ways on a mental subject, which can be expressed by ‘I’ or ‘the 
soul’ insofar as they must be had, or thought by a mental subject and are 
thus dependent (conditioned) on such a subject.12 To put the point in terms 
closer to Kant’s own, one can say that the I referred to in the phrase ‘I think’,
which is ‘the sole text’ of the Paralogisms (A343/B401), is a real condition of 
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all representation. For representations are conditioned by the “I think”, 
which is in turn conditioned by the I that makes “I think” possible insofar as 
it thinks (i.e. engages in the activity of thinking). 
Further, since each of the four Antinomies has a different real 
conditioning relation as its subject matter and since there are four distinct 
Paralogisms, it stands to reason that each Paralogism focuses on a different 
real conditioning relation.13 That is, each Paralogism concerns a different 
feature of representations that is conditioned and considers what feature of 
the mental subject is required to explain that conditioned feature. For our 
purposes, it will suffice to understand the specific real conditioning relations 
for the first three Paralogisms.
The First Paralogism notes that representations are not free-floating, 
metaphysically independent entities that could somehow think themselves 
and thus stand on their own. Instead, as representations, they must be 
mental states of a subject, in the sense that they must inhere in the mental 
subject that thinks them. But for representations to inhere in the mental 
subject that thinks them, that mental subject must, it seems, be a substance,
given that accidents must ultimately inhere in a substance and only a 
substance can act in the way required for the acts of thinking that allow 
representations to inhere in a substance.14 Thus, the I insofar as it is a 
substance that thinks representations is a real condition of the 
representations that inhere in it. 
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The Second Paralogism focuses on the fact that a representation is not 
a collection, or aggregate, of parts, but rather possesses a special kind of 
unity that (e.g. bodily) composites do not have. This (mental) unity can be 
explained, however, only if the mental subject that thinks that 
representation is simple. For the unity of a representation requires a single 
act of thinking (rather than a collection of distinct acts), which is possible, it 
seems, only if the mental subject that performs that act is simple. Thus, the I
insofar as it is simple in its act of thinking is a real condition of the 
representations that the I thereby thinks. 
The Third Paralogism picks up on the fact that a plurality of 
representations can be attributed to a single, identical mental subject. This 
point has several different aspects. First, it is not necessary that one posit a 
distinct mental subject for each numerically distinct representation, because 
different representations can be attributed to the same mental subject. 
Though Kant formulates his point with respect to personal identity over time
—since he is interested in the human case, which is temporal—it can also be 
put more generally, since God can be an identical mental subject of a 
plurality of representations without involving personal identity over time 
(given that God, for Kant, cannot be temporal). Further, representations are 
not ownerless; instead, they must belong to, and be attributed to, a person, 
who, in thinking the representation, is thereby responsible for that 
representation belonging to it.15 Finally, in light of these two points, it follows 
that a plurality of representations can be attributed to a single identical 
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person insofar as that person actually thinks all of these thoughts. Thus, the I
insofar as it is a numerically identical person that thinks is a real condition of 
the plurality of distinct representations that can all be ascribed to it. 
Accordingly, the first three Paralogisms are concerned with how different 
features of the I–its substantiality, simplicity, and personal identity–are 
different real conditions of different conditioned features of representations–
their accidentality, unity, and attributability–if the I is thinking these 
representations. 
As noted above, Kant understands reason as a faculty that seeks not 
only the conditions of whatever is conditioned, but also the totality of such 
conditions and thus the unconditioned. This connection of reason and the 
unconditioned plays out in two main ways for Kant, one concerning our 
representations of the objects of traditional metaphysics, the other 
concerning a line of argument that would establish the existence of 
something unconditioned. Consider first the connection that Kant draws 
between our ideas of reason and the objects of traditional metaphysics.16 An 
idea, for Kant, is a representation ‘to which no congruent object can be given
in the senses’ (A327/B383). Since reason is the faculty that seeks the 
unconditioned, an idea of reason is a representation of an unconditioned 
object that cannot be given in the senses. Given these views, Kant then goes
on to claim that the objects of traditional metaphysics–God, freedom, and 
the soul–are represented by means of ideas of reason. For these objects 
cannot, Kant maintains, be given in the senses and they are all 
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unconditioned in some respect. For, according to the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, God would be properly characterized as unconditioned insofar as 
nothing is the cause, or condition, of his existence. As Kant understands 
(transcendenetal) freedom, a free action would also be properly 
characterized as unconditioned, because a free action cannot be caused, or 
conditioned, and still be free. Finally, because the soul is the ultimate subject
of our representations–nothing other than, or lying behind, the I could think 
our representations–it, too, is unconditioned in this respect.17 Thus, reason is 
the faculty that represents the objects of traditional metaphysics by means 
of its ideas.
Second, in the context of his discussion of traditional metaphysics, 
Kant highlights a line of argument with respect to the unconditioned that he 
ascribes to reason.18 The basic idea is that if the conditioned is given, then 
the totality of conditions must also be given, since without all of its 
conditions, the conditioned would not be given. But if the totality of 
conditions is given, then the unconditioned must be given too, for the totality
of conditions entails the unconditioned.19 Kant repeats this argument, or at 
least its basic premises, on numerous occasions. For example, in the 
Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, he remarks: ‘if the conditioned 
is given, then so too is the whole series of conditions subordinated to each 
other, which is itself therefore unconditioned (i.e., contained in the object 
and its connection)’ (A307-8/B364). In the Antinomy of Pure Reason, he 
similarly remarks: ‘Reason demands this in accordance with the principle: If 
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the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and 
hence the absolutely unconditioned, is also given, through which alone
the conditioned was possible’ (A409/B436). Shortly thereafter, he reiterates: 
‘The absolute whole of the series of conditions for a given conditioned is 
always unconditioned, because outside it there are no more conditions 
regarding which it could be conditioned’ (A417-8/B445). 
Kant’s most basic line of thought can, I believe, be reconstructed 
roughly as follows. Take any given object x, which is conditioned.20 Since x is 
conditioned, it is an analytic truth that there must be at least one or more ys 
that happen to condition it. Otherwise, it would not be conditioned. Now let t 
be the sum of all ys that condition x (‘the whole sum of conditions’ or the 
‘absolute whole of the series of conditions’). It immediately follows that t 
must be unconditioned. For suppose, for the sake of a reductio, that t is 
conditioned. If t is conditioned, then it is an analytic truth that there must be 
some z that conditions it. Given transitivity, if z conditions t (by the 
reductio’s original assumption) and t conditions x (by being the sum of all ys 
that condition x), then z conditions x. But then, contrary to the definition of t,
t does not in fact contain all of the conditions of x. Therefore, t cannot be 
conditioned, i.e. something unconditioned must exist. In short, as soon as the
existence of something conditioned is granted, reason is committed to the 
existence of the unconditioned as well. 
Now it is crucial to note the exact status of the conclusion of this 
argument, lest one mistakenly succumb to the kind of ‘transcendental 
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illusion’ that Kant explicitly warns against in the Transcendental Dialectic. 
That is, the argument claims that, given the existence of a conditioned 
object, reason is committed to, or must posit, the existence of something 
unconditioned, which conditions the object and thus can explain its status as 
conditioned. It does not follow that we must be able to have cognition of the 
existence of the unconditioned. For to have cognition of an object, that 
object would have to be both given in sensibility and thought through the 
understanding, and Kant thinks that unconditioned objects cannot be given 
to us through the senses (A308/B365, A311/B367, A327/B383, A483/B511, 
A531/B559). Though Kant’s characterizations of transcendental illusion are 
vague and subject to different interpretations, one kind of ‘natural and 
unavoidable’ illusion (A298/B354) that he could be pointing to is that of 
accepting the following closure principle (which is false): because one 
cognizes x and reason can validly infer from x to y, one can, for that reason, 
cognize y. That is, just because reason’s inferences are truth-preserving, it 
does not follow that they are therefore also cognition-preserving. So, 
although reason is right to infer from the existence of the conditioned to the 
existence of the unconditioned, it would be a mistake to infer that we must 
therefore be able to have cognition of the unconditioned.
What’s more, this point is absolutely central to Kant’s critique of 
traditional metaphysics. For traditional metaphysics, on Kant’s analysis, 
claims to have cognition of unconditioned objects that is both synthetic and 
a priori, that is, substantive and yet not based on particular experiences. 
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What the argument provided above shows is that it is possible to infer to the 
existence of something unconditioned without relying on experience of that 
object. However, it is not possible to extend our cognition so that it would 
deliver substantive new results about unconditioned objects, such as that we
are free or that God exists. Instead, all that we are rationally committed to is 
that something unconditioned exists (and that it is a condition of the 
conditioned objects that we do cognize), but we cannot cognize (or even 
infer) any of its positive intrinsic features.21 In fact, even when we consider 
an object not merely as conditioned, but as conditioned in some specific 
respect and pursue the real conditioning relations back to the particular 
unconditioned object that conditions it, we still are unable to cognize any of 
its positive intrinsic features, much less that it must be, e.g., God (as a being
endowed with understanding and will). Kant testifies to the indeterminacy of 
this commitment, when he explicitly remarks: ‘And now we are thinking of a 
Something about which we have no concept at all of how it is in itself, but 
about which we think a relation to the sum total of appearances […]. If, 
accordingly, we assume such ideal entities, then we do not really extend our 
cognition beyond the objects of possible experience’ (B702). That is, we view
the existence of the unconditioned that we assume, or posit, so as to have a 
real unconditioned condition of the conditioned objects that we cognize, as 
merely ‘a Something’, since we cannot attribute new positive determinate 
predicates to it, thereby thwarting the ultimate goal of traditional 
metaphysics.22
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Even though we cannot extend our cognition by adding positive new 
intrinsic determinations to the unconditioned, the kind of ontological 
commitment that we have toward the unconditioned (insofar as we are 
rational) fits nicely with Kant’s claim that ideas of reason function as 
regulative principles. For this argument shows that reason is committed to 
the existence of something unconditioned and reason’s ideas, which 
represent unconditioned objects, function as regulative principles that direct 
us to pursue these objects as far as we can, even if we cannot cognize them.
Though our cognitive limitations prevent us from satisfying reason’s desire to
obtain cognition of an unconditioned condition, Kant’s argument shows that 
reason is at least committed to the existence of what our regulative 
principles of reason demand that we necessarily seek.
What has emerged from consideration of Kant’s account of reason, the 
notions of a condition it employs, and its commitment to the existence of the
unconditioned, is a larger picture of how reason functions. Reason seeks not 
only logical conditions in syllogisms, but also real conditions of objects that 
are given to us, where there are different kinds of real conditions for different
kinds of objects. Here we have focused on the different real conditions of our
representations, which revealed different features that the I must have to be 
the real condition of the different conditioned features of representations of 
which we are aware. Further, reason is committed to the existence of 
something unconditioned, though reason cannot generate the kind of 
synthetic a priori cognition that was the goal of traditional metaphysicians 
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prior to Kant, despite the natural illusion to think that we can. Instead, 
metaphysics proceeds by forming ideas of unconditioned objects that 
regulate our intellectual inquiry by helping us to find as many real conditions
as we can, and even though we cannot achieve cognition of the 
unconditioned, we can get ever closer and thus approximate such cognition. 
In this way, metaphysics does not achieve the kind of cognition it had hoped 
for, but it does provide a crucial service to our intellectual engagement with 
the world by revealing as much rational structure in the world as we are 
capable of discerning.
II. The Paralogisms and Materialism
With this broader picture of reason and the role it plays in traditional 
metaphysics in mind, we can now return to Kant’s most explicit discussion of
materialism in the first Critique in the Paralogisms. Kant’s view is 
complicated by the fact that he explicitly rejects those arguments in the 
(First and Second) Paralogisms that would contribute most directly to 
establishing the soul’s immateriality (and thus the falsity of materialism). In 
light of his rejection of these arguments, any argument he might endorse 
that would refute materialism will have to differ from these arguments in 
some way. As a result, we first have to understand the basic structure of the 
first two Paralogisms as well as Kant’s complex diagnosis of the mistakes 
that their arguments make. Only then can we see what resources are still 
available to construct an argument against materialism that differs from the 
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arguments he rejects as paralogistic. In this way, we will be able to see how 
he could be justified after all in claiming that he has ‘severed the very root of
materialism’ and thereby diffused an important threat to the possibility of 
freedom.
In the Paralogisms, Kant considers four arguments–categorical 
syllogisms that are ascribed to ‘rational psychologists’, who take nothing 
more than ‘I think’ as their premise–that have as their conclusion that the 
soul has a certain property. The argument under consideration in the First 
Paralogism concludes that the soul is a substance and that in the Second 
infers to the soul’s simplicity. In both cases, the major premise states the 
meaning of a particular term that expresses a defining feature of that 
property (substantiality and simplicity). The minor premise then notes that 
the I has the feature that figures in the definition of each property. The 
conclusion then attributes the property defined in the major premise to the 
soul. On the basis of these arguments, the rational psychologist then claims 
to have cognition that the soul is a simple substance. Since the arguments 
for this substantive conclusion depend only on (1) a definition and (2) 
aspects that are revealed through ‘I think’ (rather than any particular 
experience), the cognition that is the conclusion of the syllogism would be 
both synthetic and a priori, which, as we have seen, fits Kant’s 
characterization of the status of the claims of traditional metaphysics. And 
although immateriality is not the official topic of the First or Second 
Paralogism, it is closely related to them insofar as claiming that the soul is a 
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simple substance forms the crucial premise in an argument showing that it 
must also be immaterial.23 Thus, if the arguments attributed to the rational 
psychologist in the First and Second Paralogisms were sound, materialism 
would be in serious danger.
However, as noted above, Kant rejects these arguments, offering a 
subtle and complex diagnosis of the errors that they commit.24 First, he 
shows how the argument can be interpreted to be either invalid due to an 
ambiguity in the middle term or else valid, but then one whose conclusion 
must be understood as trivially true and thus of no use for the metaphysician
who wants to draw substantive implications from it (such as that the soul 
must also be immortal). Second, Kant shows that it would be a mistake to 
take the major and minor premises to be analytic and the conclusion 
synthetic. Third, it would be problematic to move from premises that concern
how we must think of the soul to a conclusion about how the soul must be, 
an error he points out more clearly in the B-edition. Fourth, Kant takes care 
to distinguish what can legitimately be said about the self on the basis of his 
own positive doctrines, such as the unity of apperception (which involves ‘I’ 
in a constitutive way), from the conclusions that the rational psychologists 
want to draw merely on the basis of an analysis of the concept ‘I think’.25 
While there are still further aspects to Kant’s diagnosis of how the different 
arguments go wrong, I take it that the most fundamental problem, on which 
many of the others depend, is that the soul is not given to us in intuition and 
since cognition requires that the object of cognition be given in intuition, the 
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soul cannot be cognized.26 Thus, what many of the diagnoses are pointing 
out in different ways is simply that no argument that would purport to deliver
cognition of the soul based purely on a priori considerations can justify any 
substantive conclusion in the absence of an intuition of the soul.
Given this general diagnosis, several salient points about the First and 
Second Paralogisms stand out. As for the first Paralogism, one strand of 
Kant’s diagnosis reveals that one cannot have cognition of the I as a 
substance because, as Hume astutely noted (albeit in different terms), we do
not have an intuition of a permanent object to which the category of 
substance could be applied so as to generate cognition. When I look inside 
myself, I do not see a substance, certainly not in the same way that I see 
tables and chairs (which, as configurations of matter, are spatial 
substances). Now it is true (perhaps now contra Hume) that one can be 
aware of some kind of subject, an I, that can always accompany my 
representations (e.g. by being the I that is presupposed by all of our 
judgments), but Kant notes that the representation of such an I is devoid of 
content and thus does not warrant any determinate or specific ontological 
claims about the nature of the I that is the subject of our representations 
(e.g., that it is a permanent substance). Instead, the I that is presupposed as 
the subject of our judgments is what Kant refers to as a ‘logical subject’ and 
is a substance only in a different and quite limited sense, namely that of a 
‘substance in concept’ (A400), which ‘is to be represented as a subject in 
itself without in turn being the predicate of another subject’ (A401).27 
19
However, and crucially, such a logical subject does not suffice for cognition 
that the I must be a substance in any more robust sense, for, now drawing 
on a different strand of Kant’s diagnosis, even if one acknowledges that we 
must think that there is a logical subject that underlies all possible 
judgments, it does not follow that we can determine, or cognize, what kind of
ontological entity such a logical subject must actually be. That is, what 
instantiates that logical subject could, for all we know, be an accident of a 
more fundamental substance. As a result, Kant’s general diagnosis of the 
errors of the Paralogisms helps us to understand why the argument of the 
First Paralogism cannot justify cognition that the I that is in fact the subject 
of all of my representations must be a substance.
Analogous considerations are applicable to the argument at issue in 
the Second Paralogism. Since we have no intuition of the I as a distinct 
object within ourselves, we also have no intuition of its simplicity and thus no
cognition that the I is simple. And even though the I that is presupposed by 
all of our judgments (or representations in general) is, in some sense, simple 
(i.e. it lacks parts), one might think of it as a purely formal feature of the 
subject of all judgments, since it is devoid of the content that would be 
needed to allow for cognition of its simplicity. What’s more, even if we must 
think that all of our judgments presuppose such a logical subject that is, in 
some sense, simple, we still cannot cognize that what realizes the logical 
subject must be ontologically simple, rather than complex. This last objection
is particularly relevant to the materialist, since a materialist might well 
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concede that thought requires a substance, but then deny that it requires a 
simple substance, since the brain is a complex entity with various parts 
whose proper functioning is required for thought to occur. Thus, in the 
Second Paralogism just as in the First, serious objections to the argument 
prevent us from having synthetic cognition of the ontological nature of the I 
that thinks. 
Now one might think that with the failure of the arguments at issue in 
the First and Second Paralogisms, there is no longer any hope of finding a 
justification for Kant’s rejection of materialism. With what resources could 
one accomplish such a task, if his diagnoses of the relevant arguments in the
Paralogisms have been successful in undercutting the most tempting 
inferences to substantive features of the soul? However, it is important to 
keep two points in mind here. First, note that Kant’s arguments target the 
possibility of cognition of substantive features of the self, where cognition is 
a mental state that must satisfy two non-trivial conditions, namely that the 
object of cognition must be given in sensible intuition and thought through 
concepts. And in fact, the failure to satisfy the first of these two conditions 
was the fundamental problem that Kant identified with the relevant 
arguments in the Paralogisms. Yet the fact that we cannot have cognition of 
substantive features of the soul does not immediately entail that we cannot 
infer that these substantive features obtain (even if we cannot cognize how 
they would do so). Granted, any inference that one wants to draw must be 
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justified, and that is no simple task, but the logical space in which one could 
try to develop such an argument is nonetheless available.
Second, as we have seen above, on Kant’s account, reason is 
interested not only in logical conditions that obtain between the premises 
and the conclusion in a syllogism, but also in the real conditions that obtain 
between different objects in the world, for reason seeks to infer from the 
existence of conditioned objects to the existence of their unconditioned 
condition. As we also saw above, this is true for our representations as well 
as for other kinds of objects, since representations are conditioned in 
different respects and require different kinds of real conditions, for without 
these real conditions obtaining, the representations could not exist at all. 
What’s more, Kant clearly indicates that he views the subject matter of the 
Paralogisms in precisely these terms, for he notes: ‘Pure reason is concerned
merely with the absolute totality of this synthesis, i.e., with that condition 
that is itself unconditioned […]. Because, further, the only condition 
accompanying all thinking is the I, in the universal proposition ‘I think’, 
reason has to do with this condition insofar as it is itself unconditioned’ 
(A397-8). Thus Kant clearly states that the I that reason is interested in is the
unconditioned condition of all thinking or all representations.
Taking these two points together, we can now formulate what I take to 
be Kant’s most compelling argument against the psychological materialist. 
The argument assumes that a representation is a conditioned object that 
requires a real condition; thoughts do not think themselves, but rather 
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require an I that serves as their real condition in actively thinking them. As 
we saw above, this basic fact plays out along several dimensions. 
Representations are not self-subsistent, but rather accidents; they are not an
aggregate of parts, but rather have a mental unity; they are not owner-less, 
but are rather attributable to a logical subject, or person. But at this point, 
Kant’s argument to the unconditioned becomes relevant, for, as we have 
seen, reason is justified in inferring from the existence of something 
conditioned not only to its conditions, but also to the existence of something 
unconditioned (namely the unconditioned condition of the conditioned 
representation). As a result, the existence of a representation entails the 
existence of something unconditioned. 
But what is the unconditioned something that is the real condition of 
representations? As we saw above, Kant’s generic account of reason (in 
terms of conditions in general) is unable to offer an informative answer to 
this question. However, our analysis of the real conditions of representations
reveals that the I that is the logical subject of my representations cannot be 
conditioned by anything else, because the I that thinks my thoughts cannot 
be backed up, or supported, by a further I in its thinking; no one else can 
think my thoughts for me, and nothing else can bestow unity on my 
representations.28 Because the logical subject that is the real condition of my
representations cannot be conditioned further, it must be, as we have seen, 
unconditioned.29
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However, we can now invoke a more familiar line of thought. Since 
Kant maintains that the unconditioned cannot be given in sensible intuition, 
which is in turn required for something to be an appearance, it follows that 
whatever is unconditioned cannot be an appearance. But if, as we saw 
above, the logical subject is unconditioned, then it too cannot be an 
appearance.30 And, if, according to Transcendental Idealism, matter is 
essentially an appearance (due to its spatiality), then the logical subject, or I 
that thinks, cannot be matter either. Therefore, psychological materialism, 
which claims that human beings consist entirely of matter, must be false.
Note that this argument is fully compatible with Kant’s diagnosis of the
problems that plagued the arguments at issue in the Paralogisms.31 For those
arguments inferred, mistakenly, that we can have cognition of the soul as a 
simple immaterial substance. The argument presented above does not claim 
that we can have cognition that the soul is immaterial. Instead, reason infers 
that the I that is the logical subject cannot be material, and the inference is 
based on reason alone, and not on any intuition of the soul. As a result, it 
does not allege that we have cognition of the soul. Further, the argument 
does not infer from how we must think of the logical subject to how the soul 
must be. For example, it does not infer that the logical subject is a substance
(in its typical robust sense), since it does not speculate as to what the 
ontological realization of the logical subject is.32 The logical subject could be 
a substance in the appropriate sense, but it could also, for all we know, be an
accident of some other substance.33 Finally, the argument does not ascribe 
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any positive intrinsic features to the logical subject that would go beyond 
what is required by the real conditioning relations involved in (conditioned) 
representations that form the basis of the argument. Reason does infer that 
the logical subject cannot be material, but that is a negative claim, one that 
does not entail any positive characterization of what the logical subject (or 
its ontological realization) must be.
The argument is also able to fill precisely the gap that Ameriks’ 
position left open. The argument Ameriks attributes to Kant is successful at 
showing that universal and cosmological materialism are untenable, but does
not have the resources to rule out psychological materialism, because the 
considerations it is based on are entirely generic, pertaining to all things in 
themselves. The considerations that drive the argument presented above, by
contrast, turn on specific features of representations, namely the particular 
ways in which they are conditioned and the particular ways in which the 
logical subject can serve as a real condition of those representations. As a 
result, the argument presented above is able to show that the subject of our 
thoughts, which is an intimate part of who we are as human beings, cannot 
be material, and thus that we cannot be purely material beings, as the 
psychological materialist claims.
III. Conclusion
In this way, Kant can claim to have refuted the materialist as an 
ontological position on the nature of the soul, or of the I that thinks. 
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However, Kant’s position turns out to be quite nuanced in a way that allows 
for the possibility that he is not as far from the materialist position in certain 
respects as one would initially think. Though Kant is committed to whatever 
is unconditioned being immaterial, he does not think that we can cognize 
whatever it is that is the subject of our thoughts. But we must still seek 
explanations for whatever empirical representations we have, given that 
reason’s idea of the immaterial soul serves as a regulative principle for 
explaining our representations; but since reason is interested in obtaining as 
many cognitions of psychological conditions as possible and yet cannot 
obtain cognition of anything unconditioned, it turns out that for any cognition
that we might attain, both the explandandum and the explanans will have to 
be conditioned. Thus, when it comes to providing particular explanations of 
particular thoughts, Kant will never be able to take refuge in his 
immaterialist ontological commitments. In that stance he is every bit as 
committed as the materialist to providing detailed empirical explanations 
(even if not exclusively materialist ones). 
At the same time, this is not tantamount to saying that Kant is a 
materialist when it comes to the nature of what thinks or to providing 
psychological explanations thereof. Indeed, on the latter point, Kant was 
committed to what Ameriks has called scientific immaterialism throughout 
much of his career. For the empirical conditions of our representations are 
not explicable by way of the laws that govern matter. In this respect, though 
Kant is in principle open-minded about the possibility of scientific 
26
materialism, he does think that, as the science of matter happens to work 
out, immaterialism seems to be the case.34 But note that this position does 
not follow immediately from features of his broader philosophical system, but
rather from his assessment of the adequacy of psychological scientific 
explanation in terms of mechanistic laws.
As a result, we can now better appreciate the place of the debate 
about materialism within Kant’s system. While Kant’s Transcendental 
Idealism does entail the falsity of universal and cosmological materialism, 
since there must be at least some immaterial things (things in themselves), 
he also deploys more specific resources in the course of articulating why the 
ultimate subject of our thoughts must also be immaterial. Because the I that 
is the real condition of the representations that are ascribed to it must be 
unconditioned, it cannot be a material thing. Thus, there is in the end a 
proper justification for his claim that he intends to sever the root of 
materialism, where one can take materialism not merely as a global 
metaphysical thesis, but also as one that applies to the specific subject 
matter of human beings, which was at the heart of debates throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.35
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1 Citations to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard (first) A and 
(second) B editions of 1781 and 1787. All translations are my own, though I 
have consulted the Cambridge edition translations.
2 In this paper, I abstract both from Kant’s practical considerations as well as 
from works other than the Critique of Pure Reason.
3 See esp. the Preface and the Postscript to the second, revised edition of 
Ameriks (2000). 
4 For a statement of Ameriks’ argument, see (2000, 309). Ameriks notes that 
his position is general (i.e., not a specific consequence of rational psychology) 
as follows: ‘Kant’s immaterialism does not rest essentially on claims specifically
about the mind’ (2000, 308).
5 In transcripts from his metaphysics lectures Kant repeatedly distinguishes 
matter and material. Monads, which are simple, cannot be matter, but they are
material if they constitute matter. I abstract from Kant’s terminology in the 
following.
6 To call something immaterial is not to assert anything positive of that thing, 
but rather simply to say that it is not material. Specifically, it is not to assert 
that things are in some sense ‘minded’, or mental. Kant is explicit about the 
difference between immaterialism and spiritualism (which is committed to the 
mind necessarily being able to exist without a body), noting that both 
materialism and spiritualism are unacceptable extremes (B420). Cf. Ameriks 
(2000, xvii).
7 Now Ameriks might respond by noting that there must be a non-material 
thing in itself underlying human beings, and not simply other things in the 
world, and that therefore even human beings cannot be material. However, 
unless one can show that there is some significant aspect of human beings that
is not material, this response has no bite. So what is needed is to show that 
some substantive aspect of being a human being cannot be entirely material. 
(There can be reasonable disagreement about what exactly counts as 
‘substantive’ as well as about what Kant’s ultimate interests in human beings 
are.) – Note also that one could enrich these different kinds of materialism by 
adding that everything, the world, or human beings must function exclusively 
according to mechanistic principles.
8 One way to deny that everything consists entirely of matter is to assert that 
one thing consists of something other than matter, which is still consistent with
everything else consisting of matter.  Ameriks takes Kant’s doctrine of 
immaterialism to be stronger than simply the falsity of universal materialism, 
for he thinks that ‘every concrete thing is basically non-material’ (2000, 308).
9 For discussion of the distinction between the different kinds of materialism in 
Germany at the time, see Rumore (2014).
10 This fits with Kant’s discussion of materialism in the Second Paralogism. 
11 See Watkins (2018).
12 I take it that Kant is interested here in representations that are something for
me (as opposed to those that might simply be in me), that is, in 
representations to which I can add ‘I think’.
13 This interpretation is confirmed by the table that Kant lays out at A344/B402.
14 It is true that an accident could inhere in a further accident, but, rightly or 
wrongly, Kant does not accept that there could be accidents “all the way 
down”. Thus he thinks that the existence of an accident ultimately requires the 
existence of a substance. We return to this issue below.
15 Kant conceives of a person (as opposed to a thing) as something to whom 
actions are attributable. Insofar as a person is merely a mental subject, that 
person’s representations must be attributed to her in the sense that the person
is mentally responsible for those representations. Insofar as a person is an 
agent, the person’s actions must be attributable to her in the sense that the 
person is, depending on the nature of the action, prudentially and morally 
responsible for those actions.  
16 Kant develops his account of the regulative principles of reason in detail in 
the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.
17 See Kant’s attempt in the second and third sections of the First Book of the 
Transcendental Dialectic, ‘On the Concepts of Pure Reason’.
18 I discuss this argument in detail in a longer, currently unpublished 
manuscript.
19 It is clear, e.g., from Kant’s discussion in the Antinomies at A498/B526, that 
“given” can have (at least) two different meanings, depending on whether 
things in themselves or appearances are at issue. For things in themselves to 
be given means that they exist, whereas for appearances to be given can also 
mean that the subject is aware of them (or their existence) as represented in 
sensible intuition. But note that Kant accepts the conclusion of the argument 
regardless of whether what is given are things in themselves or appearances. 
Now one might agree that the existence of a conditioned thing in itself does in 
fact entail the existence of an unconditioned thing in itself, but then argue that 
for appearances, the existence of a conditioned appearance entails only that a 
regress in the series of all of its conditions and thus the unconditioned be given
as a task (aufgegeben), not that anything unconditioned exist. However, it is 
crucial to understand exactly what the regress that is given as a task involves 
and how logical and real conditions apply to appearances. If the task that is 
given to us concerns the logical conditions of the cognition of the appearance 
that is given in sensible intuition, then the logical use of reason demands that 
we find the premises from which that cognition follows, but since we may not 
already be in possession of cognitions that can serve as premises for the 
requisite syllogism, finding cognitions that can serve as those premises is given
to us as a task. If, however, we are interested not in the logical conditions of 
the cognition of the appearance that is given to us, but rather in the real 
conditions of that appearance, then it is true that we must seek cognition of its 
real conditions, but also that its real conditions must exist (though not 
necessarily as an appearance), for if its real conditions did not exist, the 
appearance could not exist either. One could avoid this conclusion by denying 
that appearances are really conditioned, but Kant is deeply committed to 
appearances being conditioned in this way (since appearances are, e.g., 
thoroughly causally determined, according to the Second Analogy, and, as we 
have seen above, causality is a paradigm case of a real conditioning relation). 
20 Though this paragraph puts the argument in terms of real conditions, it can 
be formulated for either logical or real conditions.
21 The precise nature of this rational ‘commitment’ is controversial. For 
discussion of this and related issues, see Chignell (2007). I am sympathetic to 
calling the appropriate propositional attitude ‘belief’ in Kant’s technical sense, 
because that term comes as close as any that he recognizes.
22 See also Kant’s remarks about ‘a Something in general’ at A355.
23 Kant was clearly aware that the argument would have to make further 
assumptions. See, e.g., 28:272-3. 
24 Ameriks’ discussion of this issue in (2000 esp. pp. 47-64) is extremely 
helpful. Unfortunately, space considerations prevent a fuller defense of the 
account of transcendental illusion presupposed above.
25 Again, see Ameriks (2000, xx).
26 Note that this claim is distinct from asserting that the self is not given in 
intuition. Such an assertion is controversial and it is not possible in the current 
context to sort out the senses in which it is and is not correct.
27 Rosefeldt (2000) develops an interesting and detailed account of the logical 
subject and its role in the Paralogisms. The interpretation presented above is 
consistent with much of Rosefeldt’s interpretation. However, Rosefeldt does not
distinguish between logical and real conditions and also does not see the need 
to think that the logical subject involves any kind of ontological commitment. 
For Rosefeldt thinks that the concept of the logical subject has a content 
(Inhalt), but no real extension (Umfang) (2000, esp. 76-78 and 81-82), whereas
the interpretation presented above requires a commitment to a real extension.
28 Just to be clear, there can (indeed must, for Kant) be something real that 
underlies the I, but whatever that is, it is not a real condition of the I in the 
same respect as the I is the real condition of its representations. This point is 
analogous to the idea that our free actions are unconditioned, even if we are 
created by God. What makes both remarks possible is that something can be 
conditioned in different respects (i.e., different real conditions condition 
something conditioned in different ways). 
29 Dyck (2013, 132-4) argues that Kant is attacking the assumption that only a 
simple substance can be the causal ground of thought, emphasizing the notion 
of causality at issue here, due to Wolff’s and his followers’ reliance on a 
conception of the soul as the force that is responsible for representations. The 
argument presented above distinguishes between causal conditions and other 
kinds of relations as distinct kinds of real conditioning relations, suggests that 
the latter are at issue, and holds that the main problem with conditioning 
relations in the Paralogisms is not that they do not exist, but rather that we 
cannot cognize them. Wunderlich (2001, 175-88) argues, convincingly, that it is
quite unclear how the categories are supposed to fit in both with Kant’s 
statements about the Paralogisms and with the actual subject matter of the 
Paralogisms (177-79). Thus, though the Second Paralogism is supposed to be 
about the category of reality and the interpretation here focuses on 
constitution (as does Kant at, e.g., B420), issues that are distinct, Kant is not 
always entirely clear on the correspondence and that reality and constitution 
are closely enough related for this to be a plausible interpretation. 
30 Now it is true that what instantiates the logical subject might be a 
conditioned entity, but it would be conditioned in some respect other than the 
respect in which the logical subject is unconditioned. See note 28 above.
31 It is also compatible with Kant’s famous remark that  “through this I, or He, or
It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a 
transcendental subject of thoughts = x, which is recognized only through the 
thoughts that are its predicates” (A346/B404). For one must distinguish 
between the representational content of the logical subject, those features of 
the object to which the logical subject refers, and the representation by means 
of which one can represent and refer to the logical subject.
32 It is striking that Kant contrasts ‘the logical unity of the subject (simplicity)’, 
with ‘the real simplicity of my subject’, noting that the concept of a substance 
‘is valid only of the condition of our cognition, but not of any particular object 
that is to be specified’ (A356).
33 Note that this argument holds independently of Kant’s stance on what 
Ameriks refers to as appearance immaterialism and scientific immaterialism 
(cf. Ameriks 2000, 32-42). Phenomenal immaterialism is a separate and quite 
complicated issue (cf. Ameriks 2000, 42-5). At A379-80, Kant seems to accept 
dualism at the phenomenal level, though his argument in favor of it could 
appear problematic. Allison (1996, 92-106) discusses the relevance of the unity
of apperception to scientific materialism (in the context of a discussion of Paul 
Churchland’s views).
34 Again, see Ameriks (2000, 37-42) for the most sophisticated discussion of 
this issue.
35 I thank audience members at the conference on Early Modern Materialism, 
organized by Falk Wunderlich at Mainz University in 2014, for helpful 
comments on a much earlier version of this paper. I also thank Lucy Allais, Karl 
Ameriks, Rosalind Chaplin, Corey Dyck, Max Edwards, Stefanie Grüne, Tobias 
Rosefeldt, Joseph Stratmann, Clinton Tolley, Marcus Willaschek, Falk 
Wunderlich, and an anonymous referee for this journal for extremely helpful 
comments on a later version of this paper. If I am a person, then I am 
responsible for any remaining errors.
